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Abstract
Loot boxes are virtual items in video games that offer the player randomised in-game
rewards of uncertain in-game and real-world value. Paid loot boxes represent a lucrative
and prevalent contemporary monetisation method that encourages repeat purchase
through randomisation. The psychology literature has consistently reported a relationship
between loot boxes and problem gambling. However, various implementations of loot
boxes have not been sufficiently differentiated and separately examined. The literature
and gambling regulators have generally argued that only loot boxes that cost real-world
money to buy, and offer rewards that can be transferred to other players and are
consequently worth real-world money, constitute ‘gambling.’ This paper identifies the
potential harms of two other types of loot box: one does not cost real-world money to buy
and the other does not offer rewards that are worth real-world money and argues that both
may constitute ‘gambling’ under UK law. This paper hypothesises that even loot boxes
that neither cost real-world money to buy nor offer rewards that are worth real-world
money may be potentially harmful as they may normalise gambling behaviours. This
paper highlights that, when the game’s design and economy are exploited by players, a
particular implementation of loot boxes may involve real-world money, potentially
contrary to the game company’s intentions, and thereby effectively constitute ‘gambling.’
This paper recommends that future empirical research separately examine the potential
harms of each type of loot box.
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What Are Loot Boxes? Why Should We Care?
Loot boxes are virtual items in video games that offer the player the opportunity to obtain
randomised virtual in-game rewards of uncertain in-game and real-world value. Loot boxes,
depending on their implementation, may be purchased for a set amount of either in-game
currency or real-world money, or obtained without payment by completing in-game tasks. Loot
boxes that require payment of real-world money to purchase represent a prevalent and lucrative
contemporary randomised monetisation method that is popular with child and adult consumers
alike. The loot boxes’ rewards may be merely cosmetic or may influence gameplay more
significantly by unlocking additional game content or manipulating the player’s in-game
power. When these rewards can be transferred between players, they become valued by players
in terms of real-world money and are accordingly bought and sold in transactions involving
real-world money (Drummond et al. 2020). Players often receive rewards that they do not value
as being worth the cost of purchasing the loot box, such as duplicate items, subjectively less
attractive cosmetic items or objectively less powerful items. However, players knowingly
continue to purchase loot boxes because they want to obtain the valuable rarer items in order
to complete their collection; to increase their in-game power either to gain a competitive
advantage over other players in multiplayer games or to reduce the game’s difficulty in
single-player games; or even to make a profit by selling valuable rarer items to other players.
Loot boxes are prevalent in video games, including those age-rated to be suitable for
children, regardless of genre and hardware platform: Zendle et al.’s survey (2020) found that
56% of top-grossing mobile games and 36% of top-grossing desktop games contained loot
boxes; and that 93% of mobile games on Android containing loot boxes were deemed suitable
for children aged 12 and above, and 57% were also deemed suitable for children aged 7 and
above (p.3). Purchasing and opening loot boxes are popular with child and adult consumers
alike: the UK Gambling Commission’s survey (2019) found that 28.1% of 11–16-year-olds in
the UK have used in-game items and 22.9% paid money to open loot boxes (p.39). Macey and
Hamari’s survey (2019) found that 46.2% of eSports participants across all age groups
participated in the purchasing of loot boxes (pp.32, 35). The sale of loot boxes is lucrative
for the video game industry: Juniper Research’s study (2018) predicted that total spending on
loot boxes and skins gambling (i.e. gambling on, inter alia, eSports tournament results using
in-game cosmetic items, including those obtained from loot boxes) will rise from under US$30
billion in 2018 to US$50 billion in 2022 (p.4).
The randomised nature of loot boxes is designed to encourage purchase in manners similar
to gambling (DCMS Committee 2019, paras. 121 and 123). King and Delfabbro (2018)
propounded that loot boxes represent a ‘predatory monetization scheme’: because of loot
boxes’ designed psychological manipulations, players often become emotionally and finan-
cially committed to spending more and more money on loot boxes, likely similarly to how
gamblers become addicted, which potentially leads to gambling-related harms, such as
significant financial loss. Therefore, the regulation of loot boxes is a pressing consumer
protection issue, especially because vulnerable groups, such as children, are at risk.
Psychological Harm of Loot Boxes: Related to Gambling
Due to the random and unpredictable results of opening loot boxes, ‘the [value of the] “prizes”
won are (in financial terms) often a lot less than that of the price paid’; therefore, the act of
purchasing and opening loot boxes has been argued to constitute gambling (Griffiths 2018, p.
International Journal of Mental Health and Addiction
3). Macey and Hamari (2019) referred to the purchase of loot boxes and skins gambling as
‘emergent gambling behaviours’ (p.20). Drummond and Sauer (2018) argued that multiple
well-known implementations of loot boxes are structurally akin to gambling (pp. 531–532),
because they satisfy an adapted version of Griffiths’ (1995) definition of gambling in psy-
chology (pp. 1–2). The criteria used by Drummond and Sauer (2018) have been argued to be
overly restrictive, as they unnecessarily required loot boxes to provide a ‘competitive advan-
tage,’ and that accordingly an even higher proportion of loot boxes may be structurally similar
to gambling (Xiao 2020a).
Research has consistently reported a connection between loot boxes and problem gambling:
e.g. ‘the greater the level of an individual’s spending on loot boxes, the more severe their problem
gambling’ (Zendle et al. 2019a, p. 188; see also Brooks and Clark 2019; Kristiansen and Severin
2019; Larche et al. 2019; Li et al. 2019; Zendle et al. 2019b; Zendle and Cairns 2018, 2019). Loot
boxes have been argued to take advantage of the variable ratio schedule of reinforcement (see
Drummond and Sauer 2018: p. 530; Moshirnia 2018: p. 87; Xiao 2018: pp. 8–9) in a similar
fashion to gambling enterprises (see Skinner 1953, p. 104). Loot boxes have also been argued to
take advantage of players’ irrational decision-making biases, previously identified by the behav-
ioural economics and psychology literature (see King and Delfabbro 2019a, p. 1324; Nielsen and
Grabarczyk 2019, pp. 183–185; Xiao 2019, pp. 6–14).
The video game industry has failed to proactively combat the issue by refusing to release
player spending data to assist independent empirical research. The industry has also failed to
sufficiently and effectively self-regulate by implementing ethical game design principles (see
King and Delfabbro 2019b; Xiao and Henderson 2019; Drummond et al. 2019). Recent self-
regulatory action, such as the Entertainment Software Rating Board’s (ESRB’s) and Pan
European Game Information’s (PEGI’s)1 introduction of the ‘Includes Random Items’ label,
has been argued to be defective and potentially deceptive to consumers (Xiao 2020b). Based
on the precautionary principle (that ‘the lack of scientific certainty cannot justify [regulatory]
inactivity in cases of high risk’ (Girela 2006, p.285)), UK policymakers have argued that, in
the absence of evidence demonstrating that exposing children to gambling through loot boxes
is not harmful to them, loot boxes should not be permitted in games played by children
(DCMS Committee 2019, p. 29, para.79).2
Recent Regulatory Responses
Regulators and policymakers of multiple countries have examined whether or not the offering
of loot boxes for sale by video game companies constitutes ‘gambling’ under existing local
laws. Summarily, in the UK, France and the Netherlands, paid loot boxes that contain rewards
that can then be bought and sold between players for real-world money were found to
constitute gambling and therefore game companies would need a gambling licence to continue
to sell such loot boxes (UK Gambling Commission 2017b:p.6, para.3.8; ARJEL 2018, pp. 5,
7; Kansspelautoriteit 2018:p.14, para.4). Belgium took a stricter approach: all loot boxes that
are sold as separate, additional in-game content, regardless of whether or not the rewards they
1 Influential industry age content rating boards in North America and Europe, respectively.
2 An anonymous peer reviewer has noted that definitive negative proof that loot boxes are not harmful is
impossible to obtain from a scientific perspective. Therefore, the best evidence that regulators could hope for
from the video game industry would be potential evidence of loot boxes being unlikely to be harmful, which
would be contrary to all existing literature.
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contain are then transferable and transactable between players (and therefore possess real-
world value), were found to constitute gambling (Belgische Kansspelcommissie 2018, p. 17).
The People’s Republic of China (PRC), without considering whether or not various
implementations of loot boxes may constitute gambling, has required video game companies
to publish the probabilities of obtaining each potential reward from randomised monetisation
methods, such as loot boxes (文化部 [Ministry of Culture] (PRC) 2016, para. 6). The PRC has
also restricted the sale of in-game microtransactions, including loot boxes, to children,
regardless of whether or not the mechanics are randomised, by imposing maximum monthly
spending limits, that increase with a child’s age, on online video games (Xiao 2020c).
Categorising Loot Boxes as RRMs
Taking into account the historical development of video games, Nielsen and Grabarczyk (2019)
argued that loot boxes are only ‘a particular implementation of a more general phenomenon,’which
they coined ‘Random Reward Mechanisms’ (RRMs), which have been implemented in video
games for decades (pp. 173–175).3
‘[A]ny RRM consists of three components:
Eligibility condition→ Random procedure→ Reward’ (p.174)
The ‘eligibility condition’ refers to how the player is able to ‘trigger the random procedure.’
Different implementations could either require the defeat of certain in-game monsters or the
payment of real-world money through in-game microtransactions. This is the ‘cost’ of
engaging with the RRM. The ‘random procedure’ could be any algorithm which determines
whether or not the player will obtain a reward and what kind of reward the player will obtain.
The ‘reward’ may be ‘any element in the game that can be awarded to the player’ and may
accordingly possess ‘value’ both in-game and externally in the real-world (pp.174–175).
Nielsen and Grabarczyk argued that, when referring to RRMs, the literature should refrain
from overgeneralising the term ‘loot boxes’ because different implementations of loot boxes
ought to be appropriately classified as belonging to one of four different types of RRM (see
Table 1 below) and studied separately (pp.172–173, 194–198). This paper does so henceforth.
Four Types of RRM: but Only One Type Constitutes Gambling? Are Other Types Also
Potentially Harmful?
Nielsen and Grabarczyk suggested that the ‘cost’ of the eligibility condition and the ‘value’ of
the reward can both either be ‘isolated’ from the real-world economy, i.e. be worthless outside
of the in-game economy, or ‘embedded’ in the real-world economy, i.e. be transferable into
and worth real-world money (pp.192–194). Accordingly, Nielsen and Grabarczyk suggested
that RRMs which cost real-world money should be distinguished from RRMs which require
only the investment of time to engage with (pp.192–194). Therefore, by combination, Nielsen
and Grabarczyk proposed four different types of RRM (p.196).
3 For brevity, all references hereafter to Nielsen and Grabarczyk refer to Nielsen and Grabarczyk (2019). The
year of publication is omitted and only the relevant page numbers are cited.
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Nielsen and Grabarczyk argued that only Embedded-Embedded RRMs constitute gam-
bling, as they both cost real-world money to engage with, and reward items which are of value
in the broader real-world economy (pp.197, 198). As cited above, the UK, Belgian, Dutch and
French regulators have all determined that Embedded-Embedded RRMs indeed constitute
gambling (only the Belgian regulator additionally determined that Embedded-Isolated RRMs
also constitute gambling). In the UK, Embedded-Embedded RRMs specifically constitute
‘gaming,’ defined as ‘playing a game of chance for a prize,’ which is a type of regulated
gambling (Gambling Act 2005 (c. 19): sec.6(1)). The ‘random procedure’ which determines
the prize qualifies RRMs as games of chance, whilst the prizes of Embedded-Embedded
RRMs being worth real-world money satisfy the ‘money or money’s worth’ statutory require-
ment (Gambling Act 2005:sec.6(5)(a); see Xiao 2018:pp.17–20).4 The qualification of a type
of RRM as gambling is particularly important because any such RRMs ought to be regulated to
ensure that the public is sufficiently protected from gambling-related harms, such as addiction and
financial loss.
Nielsen and Grabarczyk’s RRM categorisation framework clarifies and differentiates
between the multiple types of loot boxes currently implemented in video games. However,
Nielsen and Grabarczyk’s, the national gambling regulators’, and others’ qualification of only
Embedded-Embedded RRMs as ‘gambling’ (pp.197, 198) is potentially underinclusive and
may fail to sufficiently protect consumers from potential harms.
This paper applies existing definitions of gambling in UK law to argue that, in addition to
Embedded-Embedded RRMs, both Isolated-Embedded and Embedded-Isolated RRMs may
constitute ‘gambling’ from a UK legal perspective (and potentially under similar legal
definitions of gambling in other comparable jurisdictions). Furthermore, this paper identifies
that both Isolated-Embedded and Embedded-Isolated RRMs are closely related to gambling
activities, and suggests that both are potentially similarly harmful, because they either directly
involve or are capable of involving, real-world money, such that regulation of both may be
justified even if they do not constitute gambling under existing laws. A caveat to this paper’s
arguments is that whether or not a particular implementation of an RRMmay legally constitute
gambling in a particular country depends on the law of that specific jurisdiction: there can be
Table 1 Nielsen and Grabarczyk’s categorisation of RRMs (p.196)
Cost-Value Description Examples
Embedded-Embedded Costs real-world money to engage and its reward does have real-world value. EVE Online;
Hex: Shards of Fate;
Counter-Strike: Global Offensive;
FIFA (in practice)
Embedded-Isolated Costs real-world money to engage but its reward does not have real-world value. Overwatch;
Hearthstone;
Clash Royale
Isolated-Embedded Does not cost real-world money to engage but its reward does have real-world value. Path of Exile (in practice);
FIFA (in practice)
Isolated-Isolated Does not cost real-world money to engage and its reward does not have real-world value. Yoshi’s Crafted World;
Super Mario 64 DS;
New Super Mario Bros.
FIFA (as implemented);
Path of Exile (as implemented)
4 On the legal definition of ‘money’s worth,’ R v Burt & Adams Ltd [1998] UKHL 14, [1999] AC 247
persuasively indicated that, in the context of UK gambling legislation, ‘money’s worth’ should be constructed
plainly to mean ‘the equivalent of money’ (p.251F (Lord Lloyd)); or that ‘[t]hey are worth money’ (p.253E (Lord
Nolan)); or ‘anything which is capable of being turned into money’(p.256E (Lord Hoffmann, dissenting)).
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no universal answer. Therefore, although the UK legal perspective presented in this paper may
be persuasive in other comparable jurisdictions, it is directly applicable only to the UK.
In relation to Isolated-Isolated RRMs, this paper identifies potentially problematic example
games and existing regulatory responses to them, in order to hypothesise that, although
Isolated-Isolated RRMs do not constitute gambling under existing definitions in law and
psychology, they are potentially harmful because they risk normalising gambling behaviour,
especially in relation to vulnerable groups, such as children. This paper argues that Isolated-
Isolated RRMs have not been subject to sufficient scrutiny and therefore the potential harms of
Isolated-Isolated RRMs should be the subject of future empirical research.
Finally, by analysing the FutGalaxy.com case and the RRMs implemented in EA’s FIFA
games, this paper highlights that a particular implementation of an RRM intended and
implemented by the game company to be a certain type (e.g. Isolated-Isolated) may in practice
become another type (e.g. Isolated-Embedded or Embedded-Embedded) when the game’s in-
game economy and item transfer systems are exploited by its players.
Isolated-Embedded RRMs: The Opportunity to ‘Cash-out’
Isolated-Embedded RRMs refer to game mechanics which are free for the player to engage with,
but reward the player with random prizes that possess real-world value because in-game systems
facilitate the transfer of in-game items from one player to another. In laissez-faire game economies,
in-game items are allowed to be freely and directly transferred amongst players (e.g. inPath of Exile
(Grinding Gear Games 2013) and EVE Online (CCP Games 2003)). Other games with more
controlled economiesmay allow players to indirectly transfer items through an auction house which
is controlled by the game company and which may charge a fee for listing items or take a cut on the
transaction price of sold items (e.g. in Hex: Shards of Fate (Hex Entertainment 2016)): such in-
game transfer systems can be utilised (or abused5) by players to make seemingly unequal and
inequitable transfers of in-game items which are complemented with an external transaction in the
real-world economy which would appropriately compensate the player losing out on the in-game
transaction. This process, known as ‘cashing-out,’ gives in-game items embedded value in the real-
world and operates regardless of whether the cost of the eligibility condition is isolated or
embedded.
Criminal Risks of Cashing-out Features
The ability to cash-out virtual, in-game items for real-world money, especially when conducted
through unauthorised third-party sites, exposes players to criminality and illegality, such as fraud;
spamming,whichmay constitute harassment and cyber stalking (Crown Prosecution Service 2018);
and profits derived from hacking the game through, for example, duplicating in-game items by
exploiting software bugs. In-game trading systems of online games being misused for money
laundering has been well-documented by PRC media (e.g.新浪游戏 [Sina Games] 2013;腾讯游戏
[Tencent Games] 2014). In October 2019, the ability to cash-out was disabled globally forCounter-
Strike: Global Offensive (CS:GO) (Hidden Path Entertainment and Valve Corporation 2012) by the
game’s publisher because ‘worldwide fraud networks have recently shifted to using CS:GO keys to
5 For example, in FIFA 18 (EA 2017), such use is prohibited by the game’s user agreement (EA 2019a:secs.6
and 8); however, players actively contravene such prohibition (see Yin-Poole 2017).
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liquidate their gains, [such that] nearly all key purchases that end up being traded or sold on the
marketplace are believed to be fraud-sourced’ (Valve Corporation 2019).
Given the existing criminal abuse, and the potential for additional, severer abuse of cashing-
out features, there is a substantial public policy reason to subject this area to regulatory
oversight. Existing measures to counteract the abuse of cashing-out features, such as punishing
those caught doing so by banning their user accounts or refunding victims, are ineffective at
eliminating the root cause of the problem because such measures respond only after the abuses
have occurred and after harm has already been caused. The blanket ban of cashing-out features
would prevent abuse and harm before they occur (Xiao 2019, p. 24).
The UK Gambling Commission’s position paper on loot boxes and skins gambling (2017b)
opined that: ‘Where facilities for gambling are offered using [in-game items that can be cashed-
out], a licence is required in exactly the same manner as would be expected in circumstances
where somebody uses or receives casino chips as a method of payment for gambling, which can
later be exchanged for cash.’ (p.6, para. 3.8). Isolated-Embedded RRMs are at risk of being
indirectly involved with gambling activities, such as skins gambling, because their embedded
rewards would be transferable between players and of real-world value. Children are at risk: the
UK Gambling Commission’s survey (2019) found that 6% of 11–16-year-olds in the UK who
are aware of in-game items ‘have bet with in-game items on websites outside of the game or
privately (e.g. with friends)’ (p.39). In addition, the ability to cash-out, which is inherent to any
RRMs with embedded value, has been and continues to be widely criminally misused but
remains severely underregulated. Therefore, regardless of whether or not Isolated-Embedded
RRMs constitute ‘gambling’ under the existing laws of a particular jurisdiction, there is a
potential jurisprudential basis for regulating them.
Isolated-Embedded RRMs May Constitute Gambling Under UK Law
With regard to ‘gaming,’ a type of regulated gambling, the UK Gambling Act 2005 defines
that: ‘… a person plays a game of chance for a prize… whether or not he risks losing anything
at the game’ (sec.6(4)(b), emphasis added). This is in contrast to many other jurisdictions. The
Act further defines that ‘… “prize” in relation to gaming… means money or money’s worth’
(sec.6(5)(a)). The UK Gambling Commission’s position paper on loot boxes (2017b) specif-
ically recognised that in-game items may be either ‘acquired through gameplay (randomly or
as a reward)… or purchased from the game’s publisher with real money’ (p.5, para.3.1), and
opined that: ‘… the ability to convert in-game items into cash, or to trade them (for other items
of value), means they attain a real world value and become articles of money or money’s
worth’ (p.6, para.3.8). Accordingly, a game which the player does not risk losing anything by
playing (i.e. is free to participate in), but which would reward the player with something of
value in the real-world economy if they win (partially) by chance, may be recognised under
UK law specifically as playing a ‘game of chance,’ or ‘gaming,’ and generally as gambling.
Therefore, Isolated-Embedded RRMs whose cost to engage is isolated within the game and
therefore do not cost any money to trigger, but whose reward is transferable into real-world
value and therefore embedded in the real-world economy, may constitute ‘gambling’ under
UK law. A free prize draw would not constitute ‘gaming’ and therefore ‘gambling’ in the UK
because it does not involve ‘playing a game.’ However, Isolated-Embedded RRMs are literally
presented inside a video ‘game’ and often require the completion of in-game tasks (i.e. literally
‘playing a game’) for them to be accessed by the player. Therefore, a particular implementation
of an Isolated-Embedded RRM, such as a loot box which can be obtained by defeating an
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enemy and which contains items that can be transferred between players, may well constitute
gambling under UK law.
Embedded-Isolated RRMs: Gambling for Perceived Value
and for Services
Embedded-Isolated RRMs refer to game mechanics which cost money to engage with, but
only reward the player with prizes which cannot be cashed-out into the real world. Xiao
(2020a) proposed conceptualising the loot box transaction as a gamble between the purchasing
player and the game company:
‘The player is risking losing money (when they obtain worthless in-game items) for a
chance to obtain rare and valuable items at very little cost, whilst the company is risking
having to immediately provide the player with rare and valuable items at an undervalue,
and losing out on additional potential sales, for a chance to instead provide the player
with worthless in-game items even though they have paid money.’
The ‘rare and valuable items’ and the ‘worth’ referred to in this proposition is not limited to the
concept of monetary value in the real world, because game companies attach a range of rarities
to the potential rewards of RRMs, including those that cannot be cashed-out, through the
imposition of artificial scarcity which ensures that certain rewards are rarer and less likely to be
obtained than others. For example, RRM rewards are assigned the rarities of ‘common,’ ‘rare,’
‘epic’ and ‘legendary’ in Hearthstone (Blizzard Entertainment 2014). Public disclosure of the
probabilities of obtaining potential rewards, as required by PRC law, has revealed that ‘epic’
rewards can be obtained in approximately 20% of loot boxes, whilst ‘legendary’ rewards can be
obtained in approximately only 5% (Blizzard Entertainment 2018). Such rarities and value may
be reflected in-game through more unique and impactful in-game effects (e.g. in Clash Royale
(Supercell 2016)) or more eye-catching cosmetic visual effects (e.g. in Overwatch (Blizzard
Entertainment 2016)), or imposed through in-game currency systems which attach varying
value depending on rarity (e.g. inHearthstone, the game will pay a player 100 Arcane Dust (an
in-game currency) in exchange for the player giving up a regular ‘epic’ reward and 400 Arcane
Dust for a regular ‘legendary’ reward). Regardless of how the superior rarities and higher
perceived value are represented, the commercial success of games implementing Embedded-
Isolated RRMs, such as Hearthstone, demonstrates that players ‘value’ and are willing to pay
for such rewards even though they do not possess monetary value (see Drummond et al. 2020).
Cashing-out Is Not a Uniquely Strong Gambling Motivator
Zendle et al. (2019a) tested the hypothesis that ‘loot boxes that feature cash outmechanismsmay act as
a uniquely strong “gateway” to problem gambling’ (p.188), i.e. that Embedded-Embedded RRMs are
more likely to lead players to problemgambling thanEmbedded-IsolatedRRMs. Zendle et al. (2019a)
were only able to demonstrate that the presence of cashing-out merely mildly strengthened the
relationship between loot box spending and problem gambling (p.188). Admittedly, the possibility
of cashing-out remains prone to abuse and dangerous to players; however, the potential real-world
value of loot box rewards does not appear to be a uniquely strong motivator of loot box purchases: ‘if
loot boxes are being sold to players for real-world money, then their purchase is linked to problem
gambling’ (Zendle et al. 2019a, p. 181). Therefore, Embedded-Isolated RRMs may be equally as
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potentially harmful as Embedded-Embedded RRMs because players remain exposed to potential
gambling-related harms, such as addiction and financial loss. Accordingly, regardless of whether or
not Embedded-Isolated RRMs constitute ‘gambling’ under the existing laws of a particular jurisdic-
tion, there is a potential jurisprudential basis for regulating them.
UK Law Theoretically Recognises Gambling for Perceived Value as Gambling
Within the UK legal context, the Gambling Act 2005 states that: ‘“prize” in relation to a gaming
machine includes any … right or service won…’ (sec.239(a), emphasis added). This definition
relating to gaming machines is not necessarily directly applicable to all RRMs. However, the drafting
language is persuasive at indicating UK law’s theoretical position that gambling for a potentially non-
transferable interest still constitutes gambling. The UKGambling Commission (2016) has opined that
‘services,’ without specifying that they must be transferable, are included in the ‘money’s worth’
definition for ‘prizes’ in the more general context of ‘gaming,’ a type of regulated gambling (p. 11). A
virtual item which grants the player the ability to decorate their in-game character in a certain way is
arguably a licenced ‘right’ and covered by a plain construction of the legal definition. This ‘right’ to
change the gamevisually can also be construed as a ‘service’ that the player haswon and that the game
company may be obliged to perform, depending on the user agreement. Certain implementations of
Embedded-Isolated RRMs may therefore constitute ‘gambling’ under UK law.
The UK Gambling Act’s legal definitions suggest that the law recognises that the attraction
of gambling stems not necessarily from the monetary value of the potential prize, but rather
from the perceived value and benefits that the gambler may attach to the prize, regardless
of whether or not it is monetarily significant or transferable. Therefore, it must be accepted that
a virtual item, which is not transferable to other players and therefore does not have monetary
value, can nonetheless be inherently valued by the player. This recognition of perceived value
as capable of being an incentive to gamble is in accordance with perspectives from the
psychology literature: for example, Griffiths’ (1995) more restrictive definition of gambling
includes the ‘re-allocation of wealth’ criterion which explicitly recognises that it can be
satisfied by the exchange of ‘something of value,’ which does not necessarily have to be
money (p.1); King’s (2018) more general definition of gambling recognises that ‘something of
value,’ not necessarily ‘a monetary sum,’ would satisfy the prize element of gambling (pp. 21–
22). As long as a player must pay money to engage with a random activity that potentially
rewards a prize to which the player attached perceived value, that activity structurally
constitutes gambling.
Recent UK Regulatory Recommendation Recognises Gambling for Perceived Value
Notably, the DCMS Committee (2019) has recommended that the UK Government take
immediate regulatory action by amending the Gambling Act 2005 to ‘specify that loot boxes
are a game of chance’ (p. 34, para.98), and also to extend ‘the existing concept of “money’s
worth”’ to cover all potential prizes of loot boxes, regardless of whether or not they can be
cashed-out, so as to ‘adequately reflect people’s real-world experiences of spending in [video]
games’ (p. 34, para.97). Both of these recommendations seek to confirm that Embedded-
Isolated RRMs, in addition to Embedded-Embedded RRMs, ought to be appropriately
recognised as gambling under UK law. The DCMS Committee’s recent recommendations
suggest that it does not believe Embedded-Isolated RRMs currently constitute gambling in the
UK without amendments to the Gambling Act 2005. However, as this paper argued above,
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certain implementations of Embedded-Isolated RRMs may already satisfy the existing UK
definition of gambling because isolated rewards may constitute ‘services’ to the player that
have to be performed by the game company, which would be ‘money’s worth.’ The DCMS
Committee's recommended amendments to the law would confirm that all Embedded-Isolated
RRMs constitute ‘gambling.’
Isolated-Isolated RRMs: Normalising Gambling Behaviour?
Isolated-Isolated RRMs refer to game mechanics which are free for the player to engage with,
and which would only reward the player with prizes that cannot be cashed-out into the real
world. Isolated-Isolated RRMs fail to meet any definition of ‘gambling,’ in either law or
psychology, because money is never involved. However, even though Isolated-Isolated RRMs
may not be able to cause direct financial harm, this paper hypothesises that they may still cause
potential harms to players by normalising gambling behaviour, e.g. making gambling appear
to be a regular, harmless and fun activity that many people, if not everyone, participates in.
When a game offers a player a free Isolated-Isolated RRM, the player is invited to obtain the
randomised rewards and experience the excitement associated with engaging with RRMs,
which may thereby potentially entice that player into purchasing Embedded-Embedded or
Embedded-Isolated RRMs to obtain more rewards and to experience that excitement again.
This paper identifies potentially problematic example games and existing regulatory responses
to them in the hope that future research will empirically examine the potentially harmful effects
of these seemingly innocent Isolated-Isolated RRMs.
Potential Harms of Normalising Gambling Behaviours in Children
The harmful effects of normalisation are of particular concern and potentially in need of
regulatory oversight with regard to vulnerable consumer groups, such as children (King et al.
2010, p. 181). An example of a game which potentially normalises gambling through the
offering of Isolated-Isolated RRMs is Yoshi’s Crafted World (Good-Feel 2019), which is age
content rated 3 by PEGI (2019b) as ‘suited for all persons.’ The Game’s adorable aesthetic and
simple, childish storyline clearly indicate that the Game is primarily marketed towards
children. In Yoshi’s Crafted World, in-game currency can be spent to play a virtual represen-
tation of a ‘Gacha,’ a type of randomised physical toy dispenser popularised in Japan (see
Kasahara and Hounslow 2012; see Fig. 1; cf. Fig. 2). Gacha is argued to be a type of real-life,
physical loot box, as the two are structurally similar, and thereby should be regulated (Xiao
and Henderson 2019, p. 7). This mechanic in Yoshi’s Crafted World exposes children as young
as 3 years old to elements of gambling, specifically making a wager on a randomised event to
get a potentially rarer prize. Games like Super Mario 64 DS (Nintendo 2004) and New Super
Mario Bros. (Nintendo 2006) make more direct references to gambling by simulating
established gambling games, such as roulette, poker, blackjack and slot machines, and the
casino environment, in minigames designed for children (see Fig. 3).
Casually exposing children to simulated gambling concepts from a very early age may impress
upon them that regularly engaging in gambling is a normal social behaviour. This may tempt
children, who otherwise would not have chosen to gamble, into gambling activities in the future.
However, empirical research on the potential harms of Isolated-Isolated RRMs remains forthcom-
ing. Nonetheless, censorship of simulated gambling and gambling references in video games has
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Fig. 1 Real-life Gacha machines. © 2012 Mk2010
Fig. 2 Gacha in Yoshi’s Crafted World. © 2019 Good-Feel and Nintendo
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been enacted based on this theoretically logical but as yet empirically unsubstantiated regulatory
basis in South Korea: the Game Rating and Administration Committee (GRAC n.d.), empowered
by the Game Industry Promotion Act (Law No. 16045, 2018:art.16), prevents children below the
age of 15, and restricts those under 18, from being exposed to simulated gambling content, i.e. a type
of Isolated-Isolated RRM (GRAC, n.d.). As an example of compliance, Nintendo removed entirely
the minigames which featured simulated gambling in Super Mario 64 DS from the South Korean
release of the game (The Cutting Room Floor 2019; see Fig. 4). Similarly, in Europe, through self-
regulation, PEGI (2019a), which originally rated the 2006 release of New Super Mario Bros. on the
Fig. 3 Simulated gambling in Super Mario games: clockwise from top left, Luigi-Jack, Mushroom Roulette,
Picture Poker and Super Mario Slot. © 2004; 2006 Nintendo
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Nintendo DS as PEGI 3 and ‘suited for all persons’ has since rated the 2015 rerelease of the same
game on the Nintendo Wii U as ‘PEGI 12 for infrequent teaching of gambling’ and therefore ‘not
suitable for persons under 12 years of age.’This example is further evidence that the potential harms
of normalising gambling behaviour are being recognised and already acted upon by regulators
without empirical evidence.
A direct comparison can be drawn between the regulation of Isolated-Isolated RRMs and
the regulation of violent video game content: the restriction of the inclusion of mere gambling
references from video games by law or self-regulation, such as prohibiting children from
purchasing these games, may disproportionately infringe the game companies’ freedom of
speech (see Brown v Entertainment Merchants Association, 564 U.S. 768 (2011)). Both the
empirical and regulatory bases of regulating Isolated-Isolated RRMs ought to be explored in
detail through further research before restrictive measures that will severely affect the video
game industry’s commercial interests are imposed.
The FutGalaxy.com Case: Intentionally Isolated-Isolated/
Isolated-Embedded RRMs May Unintentionally Become
Isolated-Embedded/Embedded-Embedded RRMs
The foregoing examined each type of RRM and identified their potential harms under the
assumption that an RRM will always operate as the game company originally intended, i.e.
that an Isolated-Isolated RRM will always operate as an Isolated-Isolated RRM and will never
unintentionally become a different type of RRM. However, the FutGalaxy.com case demon-
strates that game companies cannot completely control their in-game economy and their in-
game currency system, such that the boundary between each type of RRM may shift despite
the ‘best intentions’ of the game company.
In accordance with its regulatory opinion on loot boxes and skins gambling (2017b), the UK
GamblingCommission (2017a) prosecuted a third-partywebsite, FutGalaxy.com,whichwas ‘parasit-
ic’ upon the popular FIFA video games published by EA, for offences under theGamblingAct 2005.
FutGalaxy.comfacilitatedFIFAplayers to transferandgamblewith their in-gamecurrency,whichwas
intentionally isolated by the game publisher to be not interchangeable with real-world money and
Fig. 4 Title screens of Super Mario 64 DS: from left, the International, Japanese, South Korean and Mainland
Chinese versions. Notably, as annotated, the South Korean version of the game removed all simulated gambling
minigames. © 2004–2005 Nintendo
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thereby not embedded in the real-world economy (EA 2019a:sec.6). FutGalaxy.com effectively
changed the FIFAgames’ Isolated-IsolatedRRMs into Embedded-EmbeddedRRMs.
In the FIFA games, the isolated in-game currency can be used to buy what were intended by the
game publisher to be Isolated-Isolated RRMs (EA 2019b), but the games also allow the transfer of
RRM rewards between players. Any such transfer is intended by the game company to be isolated
within the in-game economy, meaning that these transfers are prohibited from being supplemented
with an external transaction that involves real-world money. However, as cited and explained above
in relation to cashing-out, players contravene such prohibition. Therefore, the ability to transfer
RRM rewards between players allows these rewards to gain real-world value, despite the game
company’s stated intentions (EA 2019a:sec.6). When exploited in this way, the implemented
Isolated-Isolated RRMs were, in practice, for those involved in the exploitation, Isolated-
Embedded RRMs. Indeed, further exploitation is possible, because the same in-game feature which
enabled the transferring of RRM rewards between players can also be abused to effectively transfer
the isolated in-game currency between players (Yin-Poole 2017).6 When additionally exploited in
this second way, the implemented Isolated-Isolated RRMs were, in practice, for those involved,
Embedded-Embedded RRMs because the cost of engaging with the RRMs, the supposedly isolated
in-game currency, has now also gained real-world value.
RRMs intentionally implemented as Isolated-Isolated RRMs in other games can similarly
become Isolated-Embedded RRMs; and either Isolated-Isolated RRMs or Isolated-Embedded
RRMs can become Embedded-Embedded RRMs. If an implemented Isolated-Isolated RRM or
Isolated-Embedded RRM is, in practice, for some players, an Embedded-Embedded RRM, then it
must be recognised and treated by the law as anEmbedded-EmbeddedRRMbecause it involves the
potential harms of Embedded-Embedded RRMs. The regulatory difficulty with the potentially
shifting boundaries between the various types of RRM is that ‘blame’ and criminal responsibility
cannot always be readily placed on the RRM provider, i.e. the game company. The company
implemented a defective Isolated-Isolated RRM that can be abused, such that it is in practice an
Embedded-Embedded RRM that facilitates gambling, and the company may financially benefit
from this. However, to its credit, the game company imposed rules to try to prevent such abuse and
it may actually have fully intended the RRM to be Isolated-Isolated.
The prosecution of FutGalaxy.com, a tertiary gambling facilitator, by the UK Gambling
Commission was, in at least one way, scapegoating, because, although the Commission
demonstrated regulatory enforcement to consumers, it failed to resolve the root of the problem,
which is that effectively Embedded-Embedded RRMs continue to exist in video games under
the guise of Isolated-Isolated and Isolated-Embedded RRMs. Not only are these effectively
Embedded-Embedded RRMs exposing adult and child players alike to potential gambling-
related harm, but they are also being presented as if they are not Embedded-Embedded RRMs,
such that they evade academic scrutiny and regulation.
Conclusion: Regulatory Significance of Classifying RRMs
Embedded-Embedded RRMs are widely accepted to be potentially harmful and legally constitute
gambling, and therefore should be regulated accordingly. Other types of RRM are less apparently
harmful, but as Nielsen and Grabarczyk recognised: ‘cognitive distortions that are said to underpin
gambling behavior can also be found in [other types of] RRMs in digital games’ (p.198).
6 Again, in contravention of the games’ rules and against the game company’s stated intentions (EA 2019c).
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This paper has argued that Embedded-Isolated and Isolated-Embedded RRMs may
constitute gambling under UK law (and potentially in other comparable jurisdictions), in
which case they should be regulated accordingly as gambling. This paper has also identified
that, regardless of whether or not Embedded-Isolated and Isolated-Embedded RRMs
constitute gambling, they are closely related to gambling activities and are potentially
similarly harmful because both types either directly involve, or are capable of involving,
real-world money; therefore, regulatory bases exist for regulating both, either as gambling
(through an extension to the existing legal definition of gambling) or with similarly strong
measures. Of more general significance, whether or not a type of RRM, or a specific
implementation of loot boxes, constitutes ‘gambling’ is a question that must be answered
within the specific legal context of each jurisdiction using the appropriate legal definition of
gambling. Accordingly, there can be no universal answer to such a question because there is
no universal legal definition of gambling, contrary to Nielsen and Grabarczyk’s
overgeneralised assertion (pp.197, 198).
This paper also hypothesised that Isolated-Isolated RRMs are potentially harmful as they
risk normalising gambling behaviours, especially in relation to vulnerable groups, such as
children. A theoretically logical but as yet empirically unsubstantiated regulatory basis can be
propounded to argue that vulnerable groups such as children should not be exposed to
Isolated-Isolated RRMs in order to prevent the normalisation of gambling behaviours in
society. Accordingly, the potential scope for regulating RRMs is wider than what the existing
literature has suggested and extends beyond the potential harms of Embedded-Embedded and
Embedded-Isolated RRMs, which have preoccupied current psychology research and previous
regulatory scrutiny. This paper recommends that future research should seek empirical evi-
dence as to the potential harms of Isolated-Embedded RRMs; Isolated-Isolated RRMs,
including loot boxes that do not require payment of real-world money to obtain; and even
the potential harms of non-randomised in-game microtransactions and game mechanics.
Finally, this paper highlighted that a particular implementation of an RRM does not always
fit neatly into the definition of any one type of RRM and may in practice become another type.
What was intended by the game company to be an Isolated-Isolated RRM can, through player
exploitation of the game’s design and in-game economy, become an Embedded-Embedded
RRM and may introduce similar potential harms.
All types of RRM are potentially harmful and the law is potentially justified to intervene
with each. Nielsen and Grabarczyk’s RRM categorisation provides a comprehensive
framework that allows researchers and regulators alike to better differentiate between
various types of RRM and avoid unhelpful overgeneralisation. This framework can help
researchers to conduct more targeted and specific research, and it will assist regulators to
better vary the extent of legal intervention against different implementations of loot boxes
and other potentially abusive game mechanics (Table 2).
Table 2 The author’s regulatory recommendations in the UK for each type of RRM
Cost-Value Author’s regulatory recommendations in the UK
Embedded-Embedded
Regulate as gambling or with similar measures.Embedded-Isolated
Isolated-Embedded
Isolated-Isolated Vulnerable groups, e.g. children, should not be exposed to them.
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